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"The Internet is like a vault with a screen door on the back.
I don't need jackhammers and atom bombs to get in when I
can walk through the backdoor. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
Amid all of the hype over Internet security with respect to
computer viruses,2 denial of service ("DOS") attacks, and con-
sumer privacy issues,4 one of the Internet's "sreen doors"-web hi-
jacking, also known as webjacking-has been overlooked. By defi-
nition, the term "hijacking" refers to the seizure of a movinj
vehicle by use of force, especially to reach an alternate destination.
By extension, the term "webjacking" refers to the seizure of a do-
main name to force web traffic to an alternate website location.
1. Anonymous, athttp://www.quoteland.com.
2. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to 'Love Bug' Talks about his License to Hack,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at C1. The Love Bug virus caused an estimated $10 bil-
lion in damages. Id.
3. Matt Richtel, Canada Arrests 15-Year-Old in Web Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2000, at Cl. In a denial of service attack, a computer is bombarded with large
amounts of meaningless data to bog the computer down so that it cannot respond
to legitimate requests. Id.
4. Erik Lipton, 2 Hired to Calm Fears for Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000,
at B3. DoubleClick announced these view hirings a week after it announced its
intentions to use its vast amount of information about how individuals use the
Internet. Id.
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 854 (3d
ed. 1992).
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A webjacking is often accomplished by the webjacker sending a
counterfeit e-mail message to the registrar controlling a domain
name registration. The counterfeit message appears to have been
sent from someone with authority over the domain name, and the
message instructs the registrar to "connect" the domain name with
a new Internet Protocol ("IP") address. Once this connection is set
up by the duped registrar, any Internet user who types the domain
name in his or her web browser is taken to whatever website the
webjacker has installed at the new IP address. Sometimes the
webjacker's website is a fraudulent copy of the original website,
causing Internet users not to notice the webjacker's scam.
Webjacking is a surprisingly easy way to take control of a web-
site. While website owners fortify their systems with firewalls and
other security measures, some have lost control of their sites as a
result of a webjacker simply e-mailing the registrar. Unless the
door that allows webjacking to happen is closed and locked, no
amount of front-facing security will protect websites from such a
rear attack.
A. Changes In Commerce Have Made On-Line Consumers Vulnerable To
Webjackings
Websites and the e-commerce that they provide have truly
changed the structure of commerce. While shopping has become
increasingly easy, advances in commerce that have provided this
ease of use have at the same time removed many indicators con-
sumers formerly relied upon to judge the integrity of a merchant.
Thus, consumers may not know when they have been webjacked to
a fraudulent website.
The traditional brick and mortar store or financial institution
was quite safe to deal with. Customers could meet the people with
whom they were dealing, physically inspect goods before buying
them, and visually inspect the store or bank itself. Although the
relatively recent advent of catalog shopping or phone banking pro-
vides less opportunity for inspection, the consumer still has ways to
evaluate the transaction. As with the brick and mortar store, run-
ning a mail order company is expensive. Mail order companies
produce well-designed, glossy catalogs in order to be accepted as
"authentic" vendors. Each catalog is so expensive to produce that
consumers have a high degree of certainty that the vendor is le-
gitimate.
E-retailers have tried to extend catalog value-indicators to the
20011 1663
3
McGillivray and Lieske: Webjacking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
web. Although Amazon.com and a few other giants have success-
fully forged new brands on-line, many of the e-retailers operate un-
der established brand names that consumers trust.6 Just as catalogs
rely on glossy pages to sell goods, e-vendors have built graphic-
intensive websites full of slick animations and eye candy design7 to
convince the consumer to buy. Unfortunately, appearances are not
always as trustworthy on-line as they are in the store or catalog. Al-
though good web design requires an artistic hand coupled with a
programmer's mind, and even though many companies pour large
amounts of development money into their websites, often a website
can as likely be built (or fraudulently duplicated) by a multi-8
national corporation as by a high school student. Thus, consum-
ers cannot easily detect when they have been webjacked to a
fraudulent website.
B. A Webjacker Can Now Steal The Whole Store
Before the Internet, although a crook could hold up a cashier
for the money from the register, a thief could never take over an
entire department store and pose as the owner. Generally, it would
have been too costly for a scam artist to mail counterfeit catalogs.
In contrast, websites are not hard to create. In fact, someone with
intermediate computer skills can, in short time, create a forged
duplicate of another website. Such forgeries have been reported
several times. For example, the AJ Park law firm in New Zealand
discovered that someone copied the code for its website at
http://www.ajpark.com, changed the "New Zealand" references
with references to Russia and routed three domain names to the
bogus site. 9 Although these forgeries could be by some kid trying
6. For example, Land's End can be accessed at www.landsend.com; Sears is
at www.sears.com; BestBuy is at www.bestbuy.com; and Target is at www.target.com.
7. For example, http://www.balthaser.com won "Best of Show" at the
@d:Tech World Awards in May, 2000; http://www.videofarm.com won the 2000
Webby for "Best Broadband Website;" and http://www.10socks.com won the Gold
for "Best Branding Campaign" at the @d:Tech Europe Awards in October, 2000.
The Webby Awards are presented by The International Academy of Digital Arts
and Sciences and hailed as the "Oscars of the Internet." Webby Awards, at http://
www.webbyawards.com.
8. The following websites are 2000 ThinkQuest Internet Challenge Finalists,
an international program for students ages twelve through nineteen: Van Gogh at
Etten, http://library.thinkquest.org/C001734; Forces of Nature, http://library.
thinkquest.org/C003603/intro2.shtml; Eyesight, an Insight, http://library.think
quest.org/C001414.
9. Reported by Damian Broadley (dbroadley@ajpark.co.nz) to the Interna-
1664 [Vol. 27:3
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to learn HTML, they also could be by some start-up law firm trying
to get a web site up as soon as possible. Whatever the reason, these
forgers do not pose a huge threat because when AJ Park's clients
type "www.ajpark.com" in their web browsers, they are not misdi-
rected to the forged website, but are correctly steered to AJ Park's
real site.
Webjackers, on the other hand, do pose a threat. Should AJ
Park's website be webjacked, its clients would surreptitiously be sent
elsewhere. If the webjacking was done for political reasons, the cli-
ent might be sent to a web page condemning the legal system, legal
fees, and attorneys. However, if the webjacking was done, for ex-
ample, in an attempt to gain credit card or other information from
unwary clients, clients could be redirected to a doppelgainger,
forged copy of the original, authentic site. Because the clients have
typed in the proper domain name and are presented with what ap-
pears to be the proper website, they are easily fooled into revealing
their private information. Because webjacking a domain name is
not very difficult to accomplish, and does not require much com-
puter skill, it may become a favorite con game of the twenty-first
I0
century.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOMAIN NAME MANAGEMENT
In order to understand webjacking, it helps to first understand
how domain names are managed, and how that management has
changed over time.
A. A Brief Histoy Of The Internet And The Emergence Of Domain Names
While the United States was involved in the Cold War, with the
threat of nuclear attack an ever present possibility, the military
funded projects in the 1960s related to packet-switching. This form
of communication splits data into many small packets, sending
each packet individually through a network and re-combining them
at the destination. Because the packets travel through the network
out-of-order and by way of any number of paths to the destination,
tional Trademark Association ("INTA") newsgroup on August 12, 2000. After AJ
Parks complained to the registrant of the domain names, the registrant blamed a
third party. The registrant has since instructed its ISP to redirect all web traffic for
the three domain names to AJ Parks' legitimate website.
10. DNS Intrusions Spotlight Security Debate, NETWORK NEWS (EUR.), May 3, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 7833925.
2001] 1665
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the goals of packet-switching were to offer communication that was
difficult to intercept and that could continue to function if part of
the network was destroyed under a large scale attack."
In the late 1960s, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency ("DARPA") chose a group of researchers from the Univer-
sity of California Los Angeles ("UCLA") to install and run a com-
puter network. Around Labor Day 1969, the group configured a
four-node network (later to be called ARPANET), linking UCLA to
Stanford Research Institute, University of California Santa Barbara,
and the University of Utah in Salt Lake City.1
2
Over time, DARPA expanded its ARPANET by linking to net-
works of other government agencies." In the 1970s, DAPRA
funded a program to expand ARPANET by building a "network of
networks."' 4 This later became known as the Internet."
In those days, Transmission Control Protocol ("TCP") was one
standard communication method that was used to transfer mes-
sages among the ARPANET computers. In January 1983, TCP was
divided into two parts. This new protocol, called TCP/IP, became
the standard for all computers using DARPA's network. In this
dual protocol system, the TCP protocol was used to guarantee reli-
able delivery of data, while the IP protocol managed the delivery of
data packets from a sending computer to a destination computer
using Internet Protocol addressing (IP addressing).6 An IP address
is a set of four numbers, each separated by a period, such as
"63.11.55.123." 7 This format is called dotted-decimal notation.
When TCP/IP was introduced in 1983, there were only a few
hundred computers connected to what is now called the Internet.
However, even with such a relatively small number of hosts, it was
difficult to distinguish all of the individual computers by their IP
11. History of the Internet, at http://www.internetvalley.com/archives/ mir-
rors/davemarsh-timeline-l.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
12. Virginia Cerf, How the Internet Came to Be, in THE ONLINE USER'S ENCYCLO-
PEDIA (1993), available at http://www.internetvalley.com/archives /mirrors/cerf-
how-inet.txt.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Of course, today, "describing the Internet as the network of networks is
like calling the space shuttle, a thing that flies." John Lester (unconfirmed
source), at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/inet-quotations19990-
09.html (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
16. Cerf, supra note 12.
17. A simple way to determine your own IP address when connected to the
Internet is to go to http://www.whatismyipaddress.com (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
1666 [Vol. 27:3
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addresses. Because names are easier to remember than numbers,
in 1984, Paul Mockapetris designed the DNS ("domain name sys-
tem"), which is a hierarchical, global network of computers acting
as name servers that translate domain names into their numerical
IP addresses.
1 8
For example, each ISP maintains a local name server. When a
web user types the URL "www.attorneys.oppenheimer.com" into his
or her browser, the browser first checks its own listing of local do-
main names. Usually, the website is located elsewhere and so the
local name server sends a request to the highest level of the DNS
hierarchy-the root server. The root server resolves the top level
portion of domain names-".com" in this example. The root
server gives the local name server the address of the ".com" name
server and the local name server sends a request to the ".com"
name server asking for the domain name to be resolved. The
".com" name server can resolve as far as the second level domain
name and so points the local name server to the name server for
"oppenheimer.com." Finally, that "oppenheimer.com" name
server can fully resolve the "www.attorneys.oppenheimer.com" to
the proper IP address. In this hierarchical fashion, domain names
are routinely resolved to IP addresses by the DNS.
Throughout the early history of the ARPANET, Dr. Jon Postel
and the Information Sciences Institute, under contract from
DARPA, maintained the list of assigned Internet numbers and
names used by the DNS.'9 In 1991, the National Science Founda-
tion ("NSF") took over the coordination of much of the Internet
infrastructure. At the beginning of 1993, NSF agreed to have Net-
work Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") manage the domain name registration
services, including the registration of domain names, and maintain-
ing the primary server in the root file server system (which is the
authoritative database of Internet domain name registrations and
their corresponding IP addresses).2I
Current users of the Internet often believe that it has always
looked as it does now. This is not true. It was not until 1991 that a
hierarchical method of accessing information over the Internet was
18. Kristin Windbigler, Exploring the Domain Name Space (Jan. 24, 1997), at
http://hotwired.lycos.com/webmonkey/webmonkey/geektalk/97/03/index4a.
html.
19. Cerf, supra note 12.
20. Id.
20011 1667
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introduced.2 The new application, which was named Gopher (af-
ter the University of Minnesota's mascot), was the first really
friendly Internet interface allowing users to access files on the net-
work through a simple menu system."
B. The Explosion Of Domain Names Results In New Management
Also in 1991, a new protocol (which had been proposed iri
1989) slowly began to be adopted. It became known as the World
Wide Web. The protocol-Hypertext Transfer Protocol, or HT[P
23for short-supported text having embedded links to other text.
24In 1993, Mosaic was developed as the world's first graphical user
25interface. Mosaic used HTTP as its protocol and allowed users to
access World Wide Web webpages that were interconnected by hy-
perlinks. Although not a standard, many in the Internet commu-
nity began prefixing domain names to be used for the World Wide
Web with "www.", such as "www.oppenheimer. com". In 1993, there
were about 600 web sites-referenced by about 600 domain names.
By 1994, that number had grown to 10,000 and to 100,000 by 1995.
As of November 2000, there were over thirty-one million domain
names registered worldwide. 26 Although some experts predicted in
June 2000, that domain name registrations may grow to 160 million
by the year 2003,27 the approval in November 2000 for seven new
top level domain names-including ".biz" and ".info"28-- may cer-
tainly cause the number to be higher. This explosive growth in reg-
istered domain names has led to an evolution in how to manage
them.
As mentioned above, before the domain name explosion, the
government through an agreement with NSI handled domain
name registrations. However, by 1997, the Internet had become
more international and commercial, making it less appropriate for
21. Cerf, supra note 12.
22. Walt Howe, A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.delphi.com/
navnet/history.html.
23. Id.
24. Marc Andreessen led the team which developed Mosaic. Id.
25. Cerf, supra note 12.
26. The current statistic on the number of registered domain names can be
found at http://www.domainstats.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
27. Domain Name Game, COMPUTERWORLD,June 12, 2000, at 71(1).
28. Press Release, ICANN, Approval for Seven New Top Level Names (Nov. 16,
2000), at http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-prl6novOO.htm.
1668 [Vol. 27:3
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U.S. research agencies to manage and fund the Internet.29 Presi-
dent Clinton directed that the DNS be privatized so that competi-
tion and international participation would be fostered. ° The result
was the formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN"), a coalition that has assumed, among
other things, responsibility for the Internet's root server system.
Domain name registration is now handled by a number of inde-
pendent registrars accredited by ICANN. There are currently over
12120 accredited registrars. The registrars accept domain name reg-
istrations from the public and report the registrations to the inde-
pendent registry. The registry is the entity that receives domain
name service information from domain name registrars, inserts
that information into a centralized database and propagates the in-
formation in Internet zone files on the Internet so that domain
names can be found by users around the world via applications
such as web browsers and email clients.3 Currently, the registry for
".com.. ".net" and ".org" registrations is maintained by a division of
Network Solutions, which was renamed the VeriSign Global Regis-
try Services when VeriSign acquired Network Solutions in March
2000
. 4
III. WEBJACKING-A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CON JOB
A webjacking occurs when a registrar is tricked into connect-
ing a domain name with the name server that resolves the domain
name to the webjacker's IP address, thus sending unknowing con-
sumers to a website controlled by the webjacker. Although Internet
trademark infringement issues and cybersquatting have received
more publicity, webjacking promises to be another serious e-
commerce problem. A number of webjackings have recently been
reported and undoubtedly, many cases go unreported.
29. Cerf, supra note 12.
30. Id.
31. ICANN's website is http://www.icann.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
32. List of Accredited and Accreditation-Qualified Registrars, at http:// www.
icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last modified Dec. 27, 2000).
33. VeriSign Global Registry Services' Glossary of Terms, at http:// www.nsiregistry.
com/glossary/gt3.html#regy (last visitedJan. 3, 2000).
34. Id.; Press Release, Verisign, VeriSign Acquires Network Solutions to Form
World's Largest Provider of Internet Trust Services (Mar. 7, 2000), at http://www.
nsol.com/news/2000/pr-20000307.html.
2001] 1669
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A. Recent Webjackings In The News
In May 2000, a webjacker stole the web.net domain name. The
domain was registered by a small Internet service provider to 3,500
nonprofit organizations. It took the Internet service provider a15
week of battling with the registrar to regain its domain name. In
the same month, a tourist portal for Bali lost its website due to
36
webjacking This caused the portal to lose substantial business.
The next month, nike.com was webjacked. Until the webjack-
ing was reversed, consumers who typed www.nike.com in their web
browsers were automatically directed to a website in Scotland main-
tained by a group called S-1I and hosted by Firstnet On-Line Ltd. 7
The redirected traffic overloaded Firstnet's server, making the
company unable to serve its legitimate customers. 38 After the com-
pany billed Nike for the use of the servers, Firstnet considered su-S . 39
ing Nike for neglecting to secure its domain name registration.
The following month-in June 2000-a $500 million public
net media company had internet.com, 1,300 other domain names,
and virtually all of its business stolen. .0 This large scale webjacking
was accomplished with just a fax machine. 41 The thief faxed a re-
quest to the registrar and the registrar promptly switch control of
the domain names to the webjacker. Although the sites were re-
gained in several days, the company's confidence in its registrar was
42
not.
One of the longest publicized webjackings is still underway. In
1994, Gary Kremen registered the domain name sex.com. In Oc-
tober, 1995 the sex.com site was allegedly stolen via a forged letter
to the registrar.43 The webjacker, Stephen Cohen, developed a
pornographic website connected to the domain name and made
millions. It took Kremen two years of litigation before a court
35. K.K. Campbell, Internet Domain Names Stolen: Businesses are Crippled After
Pirates Take Over Their Web-Site Addresses, THE GAZETrE (MONTREAL) , June 2, 2000.
36. Hijacking Going High-Tech, THE LONDON FREE PRESS, June 9, 2000, at D3.
37. Ann Harrison, Companies Point Fingers Over Nike Web Site Hijacking, NET-
woRKWoRLD FuSION, June 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 9443184.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. NS's Webjacking Epidemic, Wired News 3:00 a.m. (June 8, 2000).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sex. com Ruling: It Wasn't Stolen, Wired News 3:00 a.m. (Aug. 25, 2000).
44. Judge Returns Valuable Porn Site to Original Owner, THE MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TaIB., Nov. 29, 2000.
1670 [Vol. 27:3
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ruled on November 27, 2000 that Cohen was guilty of webjacking
the site. Pending a final decision on potential damages, the judge
has frozen $25 million in Cohen's business assets.46 A related law-
suit against the registrar for allowing the webjacking to happen was
dismissed.47
As one would expect, often it is the more 'famous' domain
names that become the target of webjacking. In addition to inter-
net.com and sex.com, the domain names for Addidas, Lu-
casArts.com, Viagra.com, Croatia.com, Washington.com, and Can-. 48 4
ada.com have all been webjacked. Even aol.com 4 9  has been
stolen.
B. How A Webjacking Occurs
Every registrar has a procedure for registering domain names
as well as a procedure by which the registrant can update its regis-
tration information, which usually can be done on-line or by send-
ing an e-mail message.' ° Webjackings can be divided into four pri-
mary phases: (1) planning the attack, (2) sending a counterfeit
request to the registrar, (3) having the registrar incorrectly deter-
mine that the request is authentic, and (4) transferring the regis-
tration to a new registrar so that the rightful registrant has a more
difficult time of recovery from the webjacking.
1. The Whois Database: Planning The Attack
Registrars allow several fields in a domain name registration to
be modified through a change request. Registrants can update
their registration record with a new legal name or a new address.
At first glance, one might assume that webjackers are concerned
with these. However, a website is not based on the real or alleged
name or street address of the registrant. Thus, these fields are not
45. Clint Boulton, Sex.com: A Chapter of Prurient Jurisprudence Closes, INTERNET
NEWS, Nov. 28, 2000, available at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article
/0,,3_520901,00.html.
46. Judge Returns Sex.com Domain to Owner, USA TODAY, Nov. 28, 2000, available
at www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti845.htm.
47. Sex. com Ruling: It Wasn't Stolen, Wired News 3:00 a.m. (Aug. 25, 2000).
48. Bob Sullivan, Web Sites 'Stolen' by Cyberthugs, ZDNET NEWS, May 31, 2000,
available at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2580039,00.html.
49. Leslie Walker, Fake Mesage Sends AOL E-Mail Astray; Security Breach Changes
Net Address, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1998, at G01.
50. E.g., http://www.networksolutions.com/makechanges (last visited Jan. 3,
2001).
20011 1671
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of concern.
Contacts are the second set of fields that can be added, de-
leted, or modified. Contacts are agents, either individuals or a
group of individuals who all act in a specific "role," who represent
the registrant on matters related to the registrant's domain name.5'
The registration lists the administrative, the technical, and the bill-
ing contact. For example, although the administrative contact may
be listed as 'John Doe" with an e-mail address of
john.doe@company.com it may just as well be listed as "Administra-
tion Group" with an e-mail address of admincon-
tact@company.com. The entity listed as one of the three contacts
should be the entity best able to answer questions about that par-
ticular aspect of the domain name registration and should be au-
thorized to represent the domain name registrant. The administra-
tive contact is usually the owner of the domain name or a
representative of the company who owns it. Some registrars oper-
ate under the rule that the administrative contract is the actual reg-
istrant.52 The billing contact should be the person to whom the in-
voices for registration and renewal should be sent. The technical
contact should be the person able to answer questions about the
website's host servers.
Webjackers are very interested in the contact information for it
is this list of people who are authorized to change the domain
name registration information. Some webjackers may already be
listed as one of the contacts because they are current or former an-
gered employees of the domain name registrant who were previ-
ously set up as a contact. Otherwise, the webjacker chooses to im-
personate one of these contacts during the webjacking.
The name servers are the third set of fields on the registration
that can be updated. As discussed above in Section 11 (A), a name
server is a computer that works as part of the DNS to resolve do-
main names to their corresponding IP addresses. Each domain
51. http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/glossary/lookup?term=Con-
tact/Agent (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
52. This causes problems when the administrative contact leaves the company
and the company then tries to get the registrar to update the records with a new
administrative contact. Domain name administrators say that in the past, regis-
trars have stated that the only way such a change request would be approved is if
the request was made via the former employee's e-mail address. In response, do-
main name administrators have had to set up a temporary mail account in the
former employee's name and send the change request from this dummy account.
Carole Fennelly, Domain Name Hijacking: It's Easier Than You Think, JAVAWORLD,
July 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14587742.
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name registration lists an IP address for both a primary and secon-
dary name server. In practice, when a web user types a URL (such
as http://www.oppenheimer.com), the hierarchical DNS is con-
tacted and the primary name server assists in resolving the domain
name to the proper IP address. If the primary server does not re-
spond, the secondary name server is used.
Because the name server controls where web traffic is directed
for the domains within its network, a webjacker usually seeks to
change the listed names servers as ones within his or her control.
All of the registration information for a given domain name is pub-
51licly available through the registrar's whois database. Planning a
webjacking attack is easy because the contract information and
name servers for a domain name can be discovered in less than a
minute.54 Based on the whois database, the webjacker knows who to
impersonate in order to get the name servers changed. The
webjacker must now figure out how to accomplish the impersona-
tion.
2. Fakemail: Sending The Counterfeit Request
E-mail is often used as the impersonation tool because it is not
difficult to do. Fake e-mail messages have been nicknamed "fake-
mail" and the process of sending them is known as "spoofing."
Fakemail messages are altered so that the message appears to have
been sent by someone else. Webjackers configure fakemail so that
the administrative contact appears to be the sender.
Unfortunately, sending fakemail is easy. There are several
websites that allow anyone to create and send a rudimentary fake-
mail message.55 Such websites alter the headers that are tradition-
ally attached to the beginning of e-mail messages. The header in-
formation includes data about the sender-including his or her
name and e-mail address-and the route the message followed dur-
ing delivery.
Most fakemail websites produce e-mail the average reader
53. The "whois" name is quite descriptive of the database, since its purpose is
to tell "who is" the registrant of a domain name. Network Solution's whois data-
base can be accessed at http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois
(last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
54. Domain Name Game, COMPUTERWORLD, June 12, 2000, at 71(1).
55. Fakemail can be sent from, inter alia, http://www.cyborg.net/mail-html;
http://www.hughesclan.com/fakemail.htm; http://www.virtualdrawing.com/fake
mail; and http://fakemail.itgo.com (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
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would accept as real. However, to create a first-rate fake message
requires more knowledge. Hackers can learn how to do this from
56the many documents available on the Internet. There is even a
"Fake Mail FAQ."57 These tutorials point out that fakemail is possi-
ble because all Internet e-mail is managed with SMTP (Simvle Mail
-58
Transfer Protocol). A hacker only needs to gain access to an
Internet-connected server. Once connected to a server, the hacker
can manually issue SMTP commands6° to fool the server into believ-
ing it received such SMTP e-mail instructions from another com-
61
puter.
Hackers say university servers in the ".edu" domain are the best
ones to try for access, because colleges and universities often have
lazy security. And because the Internet is not hampered by dis-
tances, a hacker does not need to limit his or her search for a
server. A server in Europe or Asia works just as well as a server in
America. Of the hundreds of thousand servers worldwide, the
hacker only needs to find one with inadequate security measures.
From this server, the hacker can create and send a fraudulent ser-
vice request through a fakemail message instructing the registrar to
modify the registration information for the desired domain name.
3. Authentication: Having The Registrar Incorrectly Determine That
The Request Is Real
Before any modification is made to a registration, the registrar
should first authenticate the request - verify that the e-mail mes-
sage was truly sent by the sender, and check that the sender is one
of the authorized contacts. As more registrars enter the market, it
is difficult to state that all registrars have equally adequate authen-
56. E.g., http://hackersclub.com/km/library/hack99/Mail.txt; and http://
hackersclub.com/km/library/hack/gtmhhl-2.txt (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
57. Rourke McNamara, The Fake Mail FAQ at http://www.hackerscatalog.
com/mailfaq.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2001). "FAQ" stands for "frequently asked
questions."
58. Id.
59. Access is gained via "telnet," a protocol that allows a user to log on to a
remote computer system and then to issue commands as if the user were physically
located at that other computer system.
60. STMP commands are simple; for example, "mail from" and "rcpt to" are
two STMP commands.
61. McNamara, supra note 57.
62. The Mob Boss, a.k.a. Mafia-man777, The Wonderful and Evil World of E-mail:
The Art of E-mail Forging and Tracing Explained in One Simple Text, at http://hack-
ersclub.com/km/library/hack99/Mail.txt (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
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tication policies. Although it is possible that some lax registrars
may process service requests without even looking up the list of au-
thorized contacts, it is more likely that most webjacking takes place
because although the registrar checks the list of contacts, the regis-
trar is fooled into believing that the fakemail message was sent by
one of the contacts.
Registrars must each determine how to determine that an e-
mail message is authentic. For example, Network Solutions has set
up Guardian-an authorization and authentication system which
helps protect domain name registration records from unauthorized
updates."'6 During the initial registration process, the registrant
chooses from one of three Guardian methods: (1) mail-from, (2)
crypt-password, or (3) PGP.
Mail-from is the first and the least secure Guardian method.
For domain name registrations protected by this method, all regis-
tration contacts provide NSI with their e-mail address. Whenever
NSI receives an e-mail message requesting change to the registra-
tion record, the e-mail's headers are checked and the "mail from"
field must match the contact's e-mail address that is listed in the
whois database. Of course, because the e-mail addresses are pub-
licly available through the whois database and because fakemail
easily modifies the "mail from" field, this Guardian method is sim-
ple to use, but not very secure. Network Solutions now advertises
that it has additional measures built in its policies to further au-
thenticate users having the Mail-From Guardian method. However,
as with most authentication policies, registrars do not release de-
tails of the policies to prevent against hackers devising ways to cir-
cumvent the policies.
Crypt-Password is NSI's second Guardian method, where the
contact chooses a password and all request messages must include
that password. When the contact first chooses his or her password,
Network Solutions encrypts it as the master password. Each e-mail
request must then be accompanied by a password. Network Solu-
tions encrypts the password and compares it to the contact's previ-
ously encrypted master password. If they match, the request is
processed.
63. Frequently Asked Questions about Authentication, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, avail-
able at http://www.networksolutions.com/enUS/help/guardian.jhtml (last vis-
itedJan. 3, 2001).
64. Other registrars have similar authentication systems, but only NSI will be
covered here.
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To ensure that hackers cannot gain passwords from its system,
after the master password is encrypted Network Solutions destroys
the plaintext version of the password. From this point forward,
even Network Solutions cannot determine what the contact's cor-
rect password is. If the contact forgets his or her password, the
contact can ask NSI to reset the password. Network Solutions then
follows a policy to attempt to ensure that the contact is legitimate
before resetting the password. Of course, a hacker could abuse this
password resetting procedure as part of his or her webjacking
scheme. The webjacker could also try to guess the password or find
an electronic or paper copy of the password kept by the contact.65
For these reasons and other reasons, the crypt-password is not
without its security concerns.6
The third and most secure Guardian method is PGP. PGP,
which stands for Pretty Good Privacy, is a dual key, digital signature
methodology. The specifics of PGP are beyond the topic of this
67
paper and only a simplified explanation will be offered here. PGP
operates by a contact setting up his or her digital signature. The
digital signature has two parts: a public key and a private key. The
contact can freely distribute its public key to anyone who may re-
ceive digitally signed e-mail messages from the contract. To make
distributions of the public keys simple, they are often posted on
certification servers throughout the Internet. Although the public
key is widely distributed, the contact must keep the private key con-
fidential.
When the contract composes an e-mail request to Network So-
lutions, the contact 'signs' the message before sending it. To 'sign'
the message, the entire e-mail message is encrypted with the con-
tact's private key. The encrypted message is e-mailed to NSI and
NSI attempts to decrypt the message using the contact's freely ac-
cessible public key. If the message is successfully decrypted, then
65. The FTC noted that "[m]any consumers use the same password at multi-
ple places, or leave themselves reminders on yellow stickies, or use obvious pass-
words that are easily guessed, for example, one of the most commonly used pass-
words of all is 'password'." FTC Advisory Committee on Online Access and
Security, Final Report - Second Draft, at http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/ acoas-
draft2.htm (May 8, 2000).
66. Webjackings have allegedly occurred even when password security has
been in place. Harrison, supra note 37.
67. For a more comprehensive explanation of PGP and digital signatures, see
How PGP Works, NETWORK ASSOCIATES, INC., available at http://www.pgpi.
org/doc/pgpintro (last visited Jan. 3, 2001). This document is chapter 1 of the
document Introduction to Cryptography from the PGP 6.5.1 documentation.
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NSI is assured that the message is truly from the contact because
the public key is the only key, which will decrypt messages encrypted
with the contact's private key.
Using PGP can be bothersome because contacts are accus-
tomed to the ease of traditional e-mail messaging. Thus, some reg-
istrants choose not to rely on PGP. Additionally, Network Solutions
does not currently support PGP digital signatures from Windows-
based computer systems. Only Unix-based systems are supported.
This further limits the usage of PGP.
The three tier Guardian system is NSI's security strategy.
Other registrars have their own ways to provide registrant protec-
tion. For example, Tucows' OpenSRS registrar system provides
registrants with a username and password. All changes to the do-
main name registration must be accompanied by the proper user-
name and password. While not as technologically hip as PGP digi-
tal signatures, passwords are easier to use and provide some safety.
Of course, passwords are only safe as long as they are not easily
guessed and are kept from disclosure. Tucows believes in its user-
name/password method because it is unaware of any fakemail that
has caused the OpenSRS to turn a domain name registration over
to a fraudulent party.68
Once the registrar uses its internal procedures to authenticate
the e-mail message, the registrar responds by carrying out the re-
quest. If a webjacker's fakemail message evades detection and is
authenticated, then the registrar may unknowingly replace the cur-
rent contacts with fake contacts having e-mail addresses controlled
by the webjacker. Then the registrar may fulfill the webjacker's re-
quest to change the address of the name server to one that will re-
solve the domain name to the webjacker's website. Once these
changes are processed, the domain name has been webjacked. All
web traffic will be automatically directed away from the legitimate
website and to the webjacker's website. The legitimate registrant
will not be able to easily recover from the webjacking because its
legitimate contacts are no longer authorized to make changes to
the domain name registration.
4. Laundering: Transferring The Registration To A New Registrar
After the webjacker is successful in gaining control of the do-
68. Telephone Interview with Ross Rader, Director of Product Management,
TUCOWS (Nov. 6, 2000).
2001] 1677
17
McGillivray and Lieske: Webjacking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
main name, webjackers usually attempt to cover their tracks by
'laundering' the domain name. Transferring the registration to
another registrar accomplishes the laundering. Once the registra-
tion is transferred to a new registrar, the legitimate registrant must
gain the assistance of both the original registrar and the new regis-
trar in order to recover the domain name registration from the
webjacker. This addition of another third party adds complexity to
the recovery of the registration, thus slowing down the process.
Unfortunately, transferring registrars is quite easy. The
webjacker contacts a new registrar and requests that the registra-
tion be transferred. The new registrar compares the credentials of
the requesting party against the whois database. If the information
matches-which of course it does after a webjacking-the new reg-
istrar submits the transfer request to the registry and the transfer is
automatically completed. The former registrar, to whom the
webjacker sent the fakemail message and duped into turning over
control of the domain name, is sent an information message that
the domain name will be transferred. However, the former regis-
trar is either not asked for approval, or else the transfer occurs be-
fore the rightful registrant discovers that the domain name has
been webjacked.
Although Network Solutions and other registrar recognize that
the current registrar transfer policy assists webjackers in their con
games, ICANN-who controls the transfer policy-has not yet
acted to improve the transfer system.
C. What Do Webjackers Gain?
As with any improper conduct, there are a multitude of rea-
sons why webjackers do what they do. The International Trade-
mark Association ("INTA") researched why cybersquatters know-
ingly register domain names that are confusingly similar to known
trademarks. The term "cybersquatter" refers to a person who buys
a domain name hoping to resell it for a large profit when the com-
pany wants to open a website with that domain name.7O
Although not all webjackers are cybersquatters, there are many
similarities between the two and thus the reasons for their actions
69. K.K. Campbell, The Anatomy of a Domain Name Hijacking, THE TORONTO
STAR, June 8, 2000.
70. COMPUTER USER HIGH-TECH DICrIONARY, available at http://www.com-
puteruser.com/resources/dictionary (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
1678 [Vol. 27:3
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 22
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/22
WEBJACKING
may be similar as well. INTA found that cybersquatter conduct is
usually associated with: (1) extracting money from the trademark
owner; (2) offering to sell the domain name registration to third
parties; (3) using the well-known domain name in connection with
a pornographic site; or (4) engaging in some sort of consumer
fraud, including counterfeiting. In addition to these four reasons,
webjackers may also gain (5) revenge and (6) counter-culture re-
spect.
Selling a domain name can be quite profitable. Warner
Brothers was offered warner-records.com and other similar domain
name for $350,000.72 In January, 1999, Bank of America bought
the domain name Loans.con for $3 million, and in 1999, ECom-• 73
panies spent $7.5 million buying the domain name Business.com.
As proof that domain name sales are big business, a number of
commercial websites exist that conduct domain name auctions.
74
Selling a domain name is not the only way to make money.
The webjacker turned cybersquatter may also gain money from the
domain name as part of the booming on-line pornography indus-
try. In the year 2000, experts predict the on-line sale of porno-
graphic videos, pornographic web site subscriptions, and the like• . . 75
will generate $1.4 billion. By capturing the registrant's domain
name, the webjacker can easily redirect all traffic intended for the
registrant's website to a pornographic website, in hope of encour-
aging more sales.
Not all webjackers plan on making money from the heist. Ac-
cording to registrar representatives, many the webjackers are just
angry current or former employees who want to meddle with the
71. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity, Be-
fore the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 22, 1999) (statement of
Ann Chaser, President of International Trademark Association), at http://www.
senate.gov/-judiciary/72299ac.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Chaser].
72. Id.
73. Lisa Meyer, URLiquidation, REDHERRING.COM (Nov. 10, 2000), at http:
//www.redherring.com/investor/2000/1110/inv-urllllOOO.html. The days where
domain names sell for such large amounts may be over with the cooling of tech
stocks. As evidence, the average sales price for a domain name from on-line auc-
tioneer GreatDomains.com in August 2000 was $5,150; this is a 72 percent de-
crease from just one month earlier. Id.
74. For a list of domain name auctions, see Google Web Directory, at
http://directory.google.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2001).
75. Kenneth Li, Silicon Valley: Porn Goes Public, THESTANDARD.COM, Oct. 31,
2000, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,19696,00.
html (Datamonitor's estimate).
16792001]
19
McGillivray and Lieske: Webjacking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
76,
website and domain name to retaliate against the registrant.
Other webjackers are political protestors, such as when several do-
main names were taken over and the corresponding websites dis-
played a coat of arms bearing the title "Kosovo is Serbia. 77 Still
other webjackings are done for fun, challenge, or obtaining respect
from other hackers. As one expert said, "These [webjackers] are
not 50 year olds. They'rejust showoffs.
78
D. What Do Victims Stand To Lose?
When a commercial website is webjacked, the company regis-
trant is harmed. The company loses on-line contact with its cus-
tomers. If the domain is redirected to an offensive site, such as a
pornographic site, customers may be offended and turn away.
Even if the domain name is quickly recovered, a company may lose
customers as a result of the confusion and doubts about security.
Financial institutions and other companies transferring funds
on the Internet may be vulnerable to direct monetary damage after
a webjacking. For example, merchants who receive funds via the
Internet could have their websites mirrored by the webjacker. A
customer or client might unknowingly make payments to the
webjackers. If a financial institution has its domain webjacked, the
fraudulent website might ask clients for password information or
other financial information that would allow the hacker to later ac-
cess the client's accounts or fraudulently obtain credit in the cli-
ent's name.
In July 2000, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC")79 issued an alert to financial institutions, warning the
banks to ensure their domain names are registered to them, under
their control, and clearly communicated to their customers. 0 The
alert pointed out that a webjacking could result in the loss of a
bank's on-line identity and a misdirection of its customer commu-
nications.
76. Interview with Phil Sbarbaro, Chief Litigation Counsel, Network Solutions
(Nov. 2, 2000).
77. Alana Juman Blincoe, DNS Intrusions Spotlight Security Debate, NETWORK
NEws, May 3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7833925.
78. Sbarbaro, supra note 76.
79. The OCC charters and regulates approximately 2,400 banks in the U.S.,
which account for over half of the nation's banking assets. OCC News Release, NR
2000-53,July 19, 2000.
80. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Alert 2000-9 (July 19,
2000).
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IV. OPTIONS FOR WEBJACKING VICTIMS
Registrants who are the victim of a webjacking have several op-
tions to recover the use of their domain name as well as to recover
damages resulting from the incident. Each course of action has its
advantages and disadvantages. Because webjackings are still a new
and infrequent problem, the registrars, the authorities, and the
courts are still learning how to respond appropriately.
A. Work With The Registrar
Contacting the registrar is probably always the best first re-
sponse after discovering a webjacking. Although the registrant and
registrar enter into an agreement at the time of registration, the
agreements offered by the various registrars offer little assistance to
a webjacked registrant. For example, NSI's and Tucow's 8' agree-
ments explicitly state that the registrar makes "no warranty that
[its] services will meet [registrant's] requirements, or that the ser-
vices will be uninterrupted, timely, secure, or error free. " " In addi-
tion, Tucows also makes no warranty that "defects in the Service
will be corrected.,
83
Although the registrars do not explicitly agree by contract to
help a registrant recover a webjacked domain name, registrars real-
ize that such a situation indeed carries a strong customer service
element.84 This is especially true because the registration business
is no longer a monopoly, but rather a competitive field in which
dozens of registrars battle for registration revenue. As a result,
some registrars have set up special teams, which can be contacted
with dispute resolution issues. For example, NSI's special team can
be reached at www.domainmagistrate.com or by e-mail at "resolu-
81. TUCOWS operates OpenSRS, a wholesale domain name registration ser-
vice. An ISP, web hosting company, IT consulting company or other e-commerce
business can become a partner of the OpenSRS system. OpenSRS provides access
to the domain registry and the tools necessary for the business to become a retail
provider of domain name registration services. See www.opensrs.org or www.-
tucows. com (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
82. Service Agreement, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, 18, available at http://www.-
networksolutions.com/legal/service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Jan. 3, 2001);
Form of Registration Agreement, Appendix A of Registration Service Provider Agreement,
TUCOWS, INC., 17, available at http://www.opensrs.org/OpenSRSDRAv3.0
.0.pdf (last visitedJan. 3, 2001) [hereinafter TUCO WSRegistration Agreement].
83. TUCOWS Registration Agreement, supra note 82.
84. Interview with Brenda Lazare, General Counsel, TUCOWS (Nov. 6,
2000).
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tion@netsol.com." However, it appears that these special services
are primarily directed towards trademark infringement disputes
rather than for recovery from a webjacking.
Because a webjacking usually includes laundering by transfer-
ring the registration to a 'clean' registrar, it is important to try to
prevent this transfer from occurring so that the problem can more
easily be resolved.85  Once the registrant contacts the registrar
about the webjacking, and after the registrar freezes the domain
name registration so that it will not be transferred to an unsuspect-
ing new registrar, the next step is for the registrar to investigate and
resolve the issue. The investigation may take seven to ten days, or
even longer, to get fully resolved.86
Although registrars may certainly see the need to quickly assist
with the resolution of webjackings, the registrars can be so over-
worked that it is difficult for them to more quickly resolve the prob-
lem. Unfortunately, by the time that the registration is returned to
the registrant, the registrant may have lost both money and cus-
tomers.
One of the authors has experienced first hand the frustrations
that may be encountered in working with a busy registrar after a
webjacking. A company purchased the domain name registrations
and other assets of an Internet service provider (ISP) and hired the
principal to act as president of its subsidiary. After the president
failed to properly perform his duties for six months, the company
terminated him in the Spring of 2000. The former president, who
controlled the server for a number of the domain names, immedi-
ately webjacked many of the company's domain name registration
through the registrar by changing the domain servers. For some of
these changes, the former president was still listed as the adminis-
trative contact and so easily submitted a seemingly proper request
to the registrar for the registration changes. For other registrations
in which he was not the administrative contact, he apparently used
fakemail to submit the requests.
Upon capture of the domain name registrations, and re-
routing them to servers under his control, the former president was
able to obtain and control all of the electronic traffic and e-mails
directed to the webjacked domain names. The registrar's customer
service department was contacted. However, the registrar was slow
85. Id.
86. Id.
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to respond and not very cooperative. Even after the domain regis-
trations were returned to the company after a number of days, the
problems were not fully resolved. Although the domain name reg-
istrations had been updated to use encrypted passwords, the for-
mer president somehow managed to get the registrars system to
again change the name servers. Some of the domain name regis-
trations were changed between the proper registrant and the for-
mer president more than once over the course of several weeks.
Several months later, the former president attacked again. Al-
though most of the domains were eventually regained, it was only
after lengthy struggles with the registrar. Because of this problem,
the registrant lost a number of its customers and was forced to
abandon certain of its service offerings.
B. Consider Using The UDRP-Even Though It Was Not Intended For
Webjackings
In addition to working directly with a registrar, the victim of a
webjacking may wish to avail itself of the Uniform Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy ("UDRP" or "Policy") adopted by all registrars. The
UDRP is a relatively quick and inexpensive way of resolving domain
name disputes, although it primarily intended to apply to cyber-
squatting and trademark infringement issues.
The Policy was adopted by ICANN in response to a report by
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") that cov-
ered several topics, including the recommendation that all regis-
trars follow a uniform dispute resolution policy because of the dis-
putes surrounding cybersquatting." By registering a domain name,
the registrant agrees to be bound by the registrar's current dispute
resolution policy. ss Through this Policy, an aggrieved complainant
can file a complaint through an approved administrative dispute
resolution service provider. The complainant must allege that a
registrant registered in bad faith a domain name for which the reg-
istrant has no legitimate interest, and which is identical or confus-• 89
ingly similar to a trademark of the complainant. The Policy was
87. Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last
modified Oct. 17, 2000).
88. NSI's Service Agreement, Clause 8 "Domain Name Dispute Policy," at http://
www.network.solutions.com/legal/service-agreement.jhtml.
89. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, § 4,
available at http://www.domainmagistrate.com/dispute-policy.html (Oct. 24,
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intended to resolve cybersquatting and other trademark disputes in
domain names.90
Since the adoption of the Policy, three organizations have
been accredited as dispute resolution providers (1) the Dis-
92putes.org/eResolution.ca consortium, (2) the WIPO Arbitration
and Mediation Center,93 and (3) the National Arbitration Forum.4
Through November 2000, at least 230 cases have been decided by
Disputes.org/eResolution.ca consortium panelists.9' Similarly, at
least 704 cases have been decided by National Arbitration Forum
panelists, and 730 through WXPO. 97 These numbers indicate that
the Policy is indeed being used to resolve disputes with domain
name registrations.
Although the UDRP was intended to resolve trademark dis-
putes, it appears that in October 2000, the Policy was first used to
recover from a domain name that was webjacked after a fakemail• 98
request was sent to the registrar. In that case, Gerald Mikkelson,
doing business as Internet Host Corporation, registered the do-
main name HOST.COM. Mikkelson was listed with the registrar as
both the administrative and billing contact. On May 24, 2000,
nearly six years after Mikkelson first registered the domain name,
an e-mail message was sent to the registrar requesting that the ad-
ministrative, technical and billing contacts be changed. The e-mail
also requested that the address of the name servers be altered. The
change request was refused-probably because the e-mail message's
return address was not the same as the current administrative con-
1999).
90. Sbarbaro, supra note 76.
91. Domain Magistrate Providers, at http://www.domainmagistrate.com/ pro-
viders.html#national (last visitedJan. 3, 2001).
92. http://www.eResolution.com (last modified Jan. 4, 2001).
93. http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html (last visitedJan. 4, 2001).
94. http://www.arbforum.com/domains/ (last visitedJan. 4, 2001).
95. Domain Name Administrative Decisions, ERESOLUTIONS, available at http://
www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/decisions.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2001). Un-
der ICANN Policy, Section 4(j), except for exceptional circumstances, all Domain
Name decisions must be made publicly available. Id.
96. Decisions can be viewed by going to http://www.arbforum.com/domains
and then clicking on the "domain name dispute Proceedings and Decisions" link
(last visitedJan. 4, 2001).
97. Case Results, WIPO, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains /statistics
/results.html (last modified Sept. 2000).
98. Agent Host Co. v. Host Dot Corn Investments, No. AF-0343 (Oct. 16,
2000), available at http://www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/decisions/0343.
htm.
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tact for the domain name (i.e. Mikkelson).99
Five days later, the registrar received a second e-mail message.
This message appeared to originate from Mikkelson. The message
requested that the contacts and domain name servers be changed.
Believing the request to be authentic, the registrar made the
changes after approval was given by a follow-up e-mail message,
again appearing to originate from Mikkelson. Once the changes
were made, the domain name was laundered by being transferred
to a new registrar. Some time later, Mikkelson discovered that his
domain name had been webjacked.
Mikkelson filed an on-line complaint through eResolution on
August 24, 2000. Soon thereafter, an eResolution clerk notified the
respondent by an e-mail message sent to postmaster@host.com and
the recently changed electronic address for the administrative con-
tact. In addition, the complaint and accompanying materials were
sent via registered mail to the respondent in Canada. The respon-
dent did not respond to any of the notices.
The panelist appointed to the case noted in his decision that
to obtain relief under the UDRP, the complainant must prove
three elements, namely that (i) respondent's domain name is iden-
tical or confusingly similar to a trademark in which the complain-
ant has rights; (ii) respondent has no right or legitimate interests
with respect to the domain name; and (iii) respondent's domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.'00
In analyzing the allegations before him, the panelist first de-
termined that because respondent controls the identical domain
name through which complainant previously performed business,
confusion is certain. Although the panelist failed to state that the
complainant had trademark rights to the domain name, because
Mikkelson operated a business over the Internet with the domain
name, it appears that he had indeed obtained common law trade-
mark rights to the mark HOST.
Second, the panelist searched for any legitimate interests by
the respondent in the domain name. Noting that a thief does not
have good title to what he steals, the panelist checked respondent's
actions against the indicia set forth in the UDRP of what demon-
strates rights in a domain name. Unable to find any indicia or ex-
planation by respondent, the panelist determined that respondent
99. In fact, the return address was not a genuine address for anyone. Id.
100. Id.
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had no legitimate interest in the HOST.COM domain name.
Third, the panelist determined that the respondent had regis-
tered the name and was using it in bad faith. Although the UDRP
provides factors, which indicate registration and bad faith use, most
of these factors relate to situations involving commercial competi-
tors. Because this was not the case, the panelist was forced to look
outside of the non-exclusive factors of the Policy. Stating "it would
also be difficult to say a thief acts other than in bad faith," and
pointing to how respondent gained the registration of the domain
name from the complainant (i.e., the fakemail messages), the pan-
elist held that the respondent demonstrated the requisite bad faith.
Because complainant proved all three elements-that the do-
main name is identical, that respondent had no legitimate interest
in the domain name, and that the respondent acted in bad faith-
the panelist ordered HOST.COM transferred back to complainant.
With the HOST.COM case, there is now precedent that the
UDRP can be relied upon to recover from a webjacking. However,
because the intent of the Policy was not for this purpose, it is un-
known whether subsequent panelists will allow webjacking cases to
be resolved in this fashion. In addition, because the UDRP does
not provide for expedited relief and relief is limited to the transfer
of the domain name (no damages are allowed), victims of webjack-
ing may wish to rely upon another option for quicker relief and to
recover damages. Significantly, by submitting a dispute through
the UDRP, the registrant purportedly releases the registrar from li-
ability, which may be the only real source from which to recover
monetary damages.10' It is not known whether this release would be
enforced by a court.
C. Work With Authorities
For egregious cases, a victim of webjacking should also contact
the authorities, however, as with anything related to the Internet,
webjacking is a new and unfamiliar territory for many attorneys, po-
lice officers, and federal agents from the Secret Service, FBI, or
other federal agencies. As one business consultant noted, "This is
like the Wild West days."'0 2 Thus, although there are now federal
101. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, § 4(h), available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last modified Oct. 24,
1999).
102. KK. Campbell, supra note 35.
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statutes criminalizing certain Internet activity,03 authorities may be
slow or reluctant to get involved.
D. Seek Expedited Relief In Court
When subjected to a webjacking, in addition to trying to rectify
the situation with the registrar and the authorities, the registrant
may immediately seek expedited injunctive relief or damages from
a court. The disadvantages of suing a webjacker include: (1) it can
be expensive, (2) it can take a long time, (3) the webjacker may
have no assets, and (4) it may not be possible to identify the
webjacker or obtain jurisdiction over him or her.
There are a number of federal statutes and common law
causes of action that may provide relief, including:
-the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; 
4
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act;0 5
-the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act;
-the Federal Lanham/Trademark Act; 
7
*unfair competition;S108
-the Copyright Act;
-fraud, theft, or conversion;
tortious interference with contract and prospective business
advantage;
*misappropriation of trade secrets; and
*the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") Act."'
Thus, depending on the circumstances, a domain name owner
may well have state or federal protection. These causes of actions
are briefly discussed below.
1. The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was adopted to
"strengthen protection against computer crimes. " " ° The Act covers
103. Such statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, are discussed
in Section IV (4), below.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
105. Id. §§ 2511, 2520, 2701, 2707.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
107. Id. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-29.
108. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
109. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).
110. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
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only crimes involving protected computers of a financial institution
or the United States Government, or crimes using interstate or for-
eign commerce or communication."' Therefore, protection under
the Act may not be available to some businesses that become
webjacking victims, although most Internet transactions will involve
computers used in Interstate communications.
1 2
Under the Act, a person who "knowingly and with intent to de-
fraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization" and
does so in order to continue some type of fraud, and who obtains at
least $5,000 in value, is in violation of the Act."' A violation is pun-
ishable by up to five years of imprisonment, a fine, or both. 114 If the
person is convicted under the Act after a prior similar conviction
(or even after a prior attempt at such prohibited access), they can
be imprisoned for up to ten years."' In addition, anyone who is
damaged as a result of a violation of the Act may bring a civil action
against the violator for compensatory economic damages as well as
injunctive or other equitable relief.f 6 Thus, a registrant can bring
an action (within two years) against a webjacker.
Robert Morris is the most well-known defendant so far con-
victed under the Act."' In 1988, Morris released a worm onto the
Internet. Although he was attempting to "demonstrate the inade-
quacies of current security measures on computer networks," his
worm caused many computer systems around the country to crash
or hang."' Morris was sentenced to three years of probation, 400
hours of community service, a fine of $10,050, and costs of his su-
pervision." 9
2. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act ("ECPA") was en-
acted to "address the legal privacy issues that were evolving with the
growing use of computers and other new innovations in electronic
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
112. The U.S. Secret Service has authority to investigate offenses involving fi-
nancial institutions. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(d).
113. Id. § 1030(a) (4).
114. Id. § 1030(c) (2) (B).
115. Id. § 1030(c) (3) (A), (B).
116. Id. § 1030(g).
117. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 506.
119. Id.
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communications." 20 It was intended to address the new privacy is-
sues brought about by the growing amount of electronic communi-
cation, such as e-mail. The ECPA addresses both government sur-
veillance and eavesdropping by private parties.1
2
1
The ECPA includes, among other things, prohibitions against
unlawful access to stored communications 12 and interception and
disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The Act
prohibits intentionally accessing, without authorization, a com-
puter system through which electronic communication is pro-
vided.124 Also prohibited is intentionally exceeding one's authoriza-
tion to access such a computer system, and as a result, obtaining,
altering, or preventing authorized access to an electronic commu-
nication that it is stored in the computer. 125 If the access was for
commercial gain or advantage, or for malicious damage, punish-
ment can be a fine and/or up to one year of imprisonment for the
126first offense and up to two years for subsequent offenses. If ac-
cess was for some reason other than commercial gain, commercial
advantage, or malicious damage, the party can be fined and/or im-
prisoned for not more than six months.
2 7
The ECPA also provides two private causes of action that the
registrant may bring against the webjacker. First, under the ECPA,
anyone who is aggrieved by a intentional violation of the ECPA (in-
cluding a provider of electronic communication service or a sub-
scriber) may recover preliminary and other equitable or declara-
tory relief, actual damages (including profits made by the violator),
punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litiga-
121
tion costs.
Second, any person whose electronic communication is inter-
cepted, disclosed, or intentionally misused, may obtain preliminary
or other equitable or declaratory relief, damages (including puni-
tive damages) and reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation
120. Jones Telecommunication & Multimedia Encyclopedia, JONES INT'L, available at
http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/ecpa.html (last visited Jan. 4,
2001) [hereinafterJones Telecommunication & Multimedia Encyclopedia].
121. Id.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) (1)-(2).
123. Id. § 2511(1).
124. Id. § 2701 (a) (1).
125. Id. at (a)(2).
126. Id. at (b)(1).
127. Id. at (b)(2).
128. Id. at (b), (c).
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129
costs. A civil action for this relief must be started within two years
after which the registrant had reasonable opportunity to discover
the violation. "0
3. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
Since the mid 1990s, some people have had part-time or full-
time businesses registering and then attempting to sell domain
names. For example, in May 2000, the "engineering.org" domain
name was purchased through an on-line auction for nearly
$200,000.'" These generic domain names are valuable "cyber real
estate" for which many companies may compete to use as their do-
main name. However, many domain names that have been offered
for sale are not generic, but rather are trademarks of famous com-
panies.
As discussed above in Section III(C) (1), cybersquatters reserve
domain names that are in the form of company names (such as
britishairways.com) so they can make money by reselling the do-
main names to the associated companies or to a competitor of the
trademark. For example, in 1999, Amazon.com was offered the
"amazon.gr" domain name for $1.6 million.
2
The Federal government responded to the problem of cyber-
squatting in November 1999 by enacting the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act. 133 The Act articulated a strong federal
policy against registering domain names for the purpose selling
those domain names to trademark owners. 3 4 The Act was also in-
tended to protect consumers from deception. The Act's co-
sponsor, Senator Orin Hatch, pointed out:
If consumers cannot rely on brand names on-line as they
do in the world of bricks and mortar store-fronts, few will
129. Id. § 2520(a)-(b).
130. Id. § 2520(e).
131. Press Release, Robert Balazy, Afternic.com, Most Expensive URL Ever in
the Dot-Org Domain is Sold Via Afternic.Com (May 8, 2000), at http://
www.aftemic.com/ index.cfm?a=company&sa=press&tab =display&id=000508.
132. Elizabeth Clampet, Amazon.corn Sues Alleged Cybersquatter, INTERNETNEWS,
Aug. 18, 1999, available at http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article/0,,4-
185111,00. html.
133. The Act amended the end of Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946.
15 U.S.C. § 1125.
134. Joel Voelzke, New Cybersquatting Law Gives Trademark Owners Powerful New
Weapons Against Domain Name Pirates, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & DONNELLY LLP, avail-
able at http://www.oppenheimer.com/internet/cybersquatting.shtml (last visited
Jan. 4, 2001).
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be willing to engage in e-commerce. Those who do will
bear substantial risks of being confused or even deceived.
Few Internet users would buy a car, fill a prescription, or
even shop for books on-line if they cannot be sure who
they are dealing with." 5
Under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, a
cybersquatter is liable to a trademark owner if the cybersquatter, in
bad faith, intends to profit by registering or using a domain name136
that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. There are
several factors enumerated in the Act to be used in determining
bad faith. These include, among other factors: (1) the alleged cy-
bersquatter's trademark rights in the domain name; (2) the cyber-
squatter's intent to divert consumers to a website which could harm
the goodwill of the mark or tarnish its image; (3) the cybersquat-
ter's offer to sell the domain name registration without previously
using it for bona fide sales or offers of goods or services; (4) the cy-
bersquatter's act of giving false or misleading contact information
to the registrar; and (5) the cybersquatter's knowledge that the
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to another's dis-
tinctive trademarks.1 37 In many webjackings, the webjacker may in-
deed intend to profit by using a domain name that is identical to
another's trademark. In these cases, the webjacker is also a cyber-
squatter and the registrant may seek protection under the Act.
If the registrant can prove the webjacker's bad faith, a court
may order the webjacked domain name registration forfeited, can-
celled or transferred back to the rightful registrant.138 This is in
addition to any other applicable civil action or remedy. 3 9 Because
it is often difficult for a trademark owner to obtain in personamju-
risdiction over the webjacker, the Act authorizes a trademark owner
to file an in rem civil action against the webjacker/cybersquatter.
14
0
Such an in rem action may take place in the judicial district of the
domain name registrar that registered or assigned the domain
141name.
135. Satellite Television and Intellectual Property Legislation: Hearing on HR. 1554
Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 106th Cong. (Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, co-sponsor of the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protec-
tion Act), available at http://www.senate.gov/-hatch/sat-statement.html.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
137. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
138. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
139. Id. § 1125(d) (3).
140. Id. § 1125(d) (2) (A).
141. Id.
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4. The Federal Lanham/Trademark Act
The Trademark Act, which is also known as the Lanham Act, 
4
2
protects a trademark owner from trademark infringement. To in-
fringe a registered mark, a party must use the same or a confusingly
similar mark in commerce in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services, in a man-
ner that is likely to cause confusion, or mistake or to deceive.
43
While use and registration of a domain name without more
will not generally constitute trademark usage, a domain name can,
under certain circumstances, function as a trademark.'" To be a
trademark, the domain name must identify and distinguish goods,
services, and their sources from the goods or services manufactured
or sold by others.14 For example, suppose "Big City Bank" is a reg-
istered service mark of a financial services provider operating un-
der the name Big City Bank. Suppose the bank's domain name
www.bigcitybank.com assists consumers to distinguish Big City
Bank's banking services from competing services offered by other
financial institutions.
If a domain name serves as a trademark and the webjacker
seizes control of that domain name, causing confusing or deceiving
consumers, the webjacker may be liable for trademark infringe-
ment. For example, if www.bigcitybank.com is webjacked and the
webjacker installs a website which may confuse customers when
they are automatically redirected to the webjacker's website, then
the Big City Bank service mark has been infringed.
Liability for infringement of a registered trademark may be
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the do-
main name registrant and trademark owner as a result of such ac-
tion.146 The court may also grant injunctive relief to the domain
name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or
the transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant.
147
Under the Lanham Act, a registrant may also claim that the
142. Strictly speaking, the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act is
part of the Lanham Act as well.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
144. The Trademark Office's Examination Guide No. 2-99 (Sept. 29, 1999)
(stating " [a] mark composed of a domain name is registrable as a trademark or
service mark only if it functions as a source identifier"); In reEilberg, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
1955, 1957 (TITAB 1998), available at 1998 WL 1015894.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
146. Id. § 1114(2)(D)(iv).
147. Id.
1692 [Vol. 27:3
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 22
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/22
WEBJACKING
webjacker is diluting the trademark, if the trademark is famous. 144
A trademark is diluted when the uniqueness of the mark is dimin-
ished,"" or when the mark is "linked to products of shoddy quality,
or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context." The
trademark owner can seek injunctive relief for dilution.151 If the
trademark owner can prove that the webjacker willfully intended to
dilute the mark, the owner of the famous mark is also entitled to
other remedies.152 Unfortunately, noncommercial use of the mark
by the webjacker may not be actionable as trademark dilution.1
5
5. Unfair Competition
If a domain name is not a federally registered trademark, then
the registrant still may have a claim under the Lanham Act for un-
fair competition.15 Unfair competition prevents anyone from us-
ing a term, name, symbol, or other device in connection with any
goods or services that is likely to cause confusion, cause mistake, or
to deceive a consumer as to the affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion of that person with a third party.155 Unfair competition also
prevents such confusion, mistake, or deception with regard to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods or services by a third
party.
In a webjacking situation, the webjacker fraudulently takes
control of the domain name. For a successful claim of unfair com-
petition, the original registrant must prove that the webjacker's
website associated with the domain name is used in some form for
commerce of goods or services. Secondly, the rightful registrant
must show either: (1) that these goods and services are not the reg-
istrant's but that consumers would be confused or deceived into be-
lieving otherwise; or (2) that these goods or services are indeed the
registrant's, but that consumers would be confused or deceived
into believing that there was some affiliation or association between
148. Id. § 1125(c).
149. This is known as "blurring." Siegrun D. Kane, TRADEMARK LAW, A PRACrI-
TIONER'S GUIDE, § 8:2.4[B] (PLI 3rd ed. 1999).
150. This is known as "tarnishment." Kane, supra note 149 (citing Deere & Co.
v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1).
152. Id. at (c)(2).
153. Id. at (c)(4)(B).
154. Id. at (a).
155. Id. at (a)(1)(A).
156. Id.
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the registrant and the webjacker.1
57
In addition to the Lanham Act, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") is empowered and directed to prevent unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.'5 s The FTC may commence
a civil action against any entity violating the rules against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, seeking a civil penalty of up to $10,000
per violation. 59 The FTC may also obtain temporary restraining
orders against such parties.' 6°
The FTC has indeed been interested in Internet related
crimes. From 1995 through early 2000, the FTC brought over "100
Internet-related cases, obtained permanent injunctions against
dozens of Internet-related schemes, collected over $20 million in
redress for victims of online fraud, and froze another $65 million in
cases currently in litigation.'
6 1
6. Copyright Act
The Copyright Act protects an author's work when the work is
placed in a fixed medium of expression. 16 A copyright owner en-
joys the exclusive right to exclude others from such things as re-
producing copies of the work, to preparing new, derivative works
based on the work, and distributing copies of the work.
6
1
Although the Copyright Act would not be used as a primary
mechanism to recover from a webjacking, if the webjacker has also
created a modified version of the original website (as in the AJ Park
example previously discussed), a copyright infringement case can
be brought against the webjacker. To prevent the continued in-
fringement, a court can grant both temporary and permanent in-
157. Consumers could be led to believe that there is a connection because af-
ter a webjacking, the webjacker appears on the whois database as the Administra-
tive contact for the domain name registration. Some registrars, including Network
Solutions, allege that the Administrative Contact is the actual registrant. Thus, a
consumer might be confused into believing that the webjacker owns the website
that advertises the goods or services from the rightful registrant.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
159. Id. § 45(m) (1) (A).
160. Id. § 53(b).
161. The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of
the Internet, A Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Inter-
net, Appendix B, (Mar. 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
163. Id. § 106.
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junctions.'6 4 Actual damages, profits gained by the infringing
webjacker, statutory damages of up to $100,000, attorney's fees and
costs, are also available."
7. Other Causes Of Action
Fraud, theft, conversion, tortious interference with contract,
prospective business advantage, and misappropriation of trade se-
crets are some of the other causes of action which may be brought
against the webjacker under common law. Under certain circum-
stances, webjacking may even violate RICO's prohibition against
wire fraud, bribery, and extortion. 1' 6 Treble damages for RICO vio-
lations are available through civil actions."' For example, in 1999,
Amazon.com claimed that a Greek company violated federal RICO
statutes in connection with its use of the amazon.gr domain
168
name.
E. Seek Relief Against Registrars?
A damaged webjacking victim may not be able to identify or
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant, or the defendant may have no
assets. Such a victim might consider an action against a registrar if
the registrar was negligent in allowing the webjacking to occur. For
example, some webjacked parties allege that the registrars do not
always follow their standard operating procedures and so the regis-
trar should be liable for damages resulting from its own negligent
actions. As one victim said, "The fact is that if you pay [the regis-
trar for your registration], you are presuming that in the morning
the last thing you have to worry about is whether you own your do-
mains. """
Although the case law is not well developed, initial decisions
have been reluctant to find registrars liable for their actions in
connection with domain name registrations. In the Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc. case, 170 the Ninth Circuit likened the
role of NSI to that of the U.S. Postal Service and found that the reg-
164. Id. § 502(a).
165. Id. § 504.
166. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
167. Id. § 1964.
168. Clampet, supra note 132.
169. Nike Web Hijacking Sparks Finger-Pointing; Company Trades Blame with NSI
and Host, COMPUTERWORLD,JU1y 10, 2000, at 21 (1).
170. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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istrar could not be held liable for contributory trademark in-
fringement by reason of its registration of a third party's service
mark. If the registrant seeks trademark infringement damages, the
Trademark Act explicitly exempts registrars from liability absent ap y  a ty171
showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registration. Simi-
larly, in the Kremen v. Cohen case, 172 the court granted NSI summary
judgment on a claim that it improperly transferred the domain
sex.corn pursuant to a forged letter. The court found, among
other things, that a domain name is not property subject to a con-
version claim. Other courts have likewise been hesitant to find reg-
istrars liable.
173
V. REGISTRARS' (RE)ACTIONS To COMBAT WEBJACKING
Statistically, webjackings do not occur very often. Although
NSI processes around 30,000 change requests each day, it contends
that there are only one or two webjackings (or similar problems)
each month. 74' Similarly, Tucows reports that its OpenSRS system
handles over 2,000 change requests a day and has not yet experi-
enced a webjacking. 17  Because webjackings account for such a
small portion of their transactions, and because the registrars are
hounded with other issues needing resolution, registrars have not
issued any strong, new policies to combat webjacking, although
some registrars have made improvements to their policies.
Registrars state that they do have certain checks that work to
detect fraudulent change requests during message authentication.
To maintain effectiveness, details of most of these anti-fraud
mechanisms are not disclosed. However, one method that at least
one registrar has set up is the use of a series of queues for handling
change requests, where the queues are used for different types of
domain names.176 The first queue is for open transfers. The major-
ity of domain name registrations have been assigned to this queue.
Transfers from the first queue are processed by the registrar's
171. 15U.S.C.§1114(2)(D)(iii).
172. No. C 98-20718JW, 2000 WL 708754 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2000).
173. Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1567, 1574 (N.D. Cal.
1998); Oppendahl & Larson v. Network Solutions, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164
(D. Colo. 1998); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1463, 1467 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
174. Sbarbaro, supra note 76; see also NSI's WebjackingEpidemic, Wired News 3:00
a.m. (June 8, 2000).
175. Rader, supra note 68.
176. Id.
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automated system.
The second queue is for well known domain names, which
might be very appealing for webjacking or other hijinks. Some well
known domain names, such as msn.com or att.com, have been
placed into this second queue, which is for restricted transfers. Re-
stricted transfers are processed manually to ensure that webjackings
do not disturb such busy sites.
Outdated domain name registrations form the third queue.
Outdated registrations often are so old that the contact informa-
tion may not be accurate. Often, the e-mail addresses listed for the
contacts are no longer even valid addresses. When a change re-
quests is made for outdated registrations, the registrar uses extra
effort to communicate with the listed contacts, including by phone
or my regular mail. If there is no response to these inquiries, the
change request is not be processed.
Some of the registrars have also discussed among themselves
how to more easily help a registrant recover from a webjacking.
Because usually a webjacking includes the transfer of a domain
name registration to a new, unsuspecting, registrar, some registrars
now cooperate with one another, allowing the webjacked registra-
tion to be returned to the original registrar. Although this is a lost
customer for the new registrar, it allows the original registrar to re-
turn to the rightful owner control over the domain name.177
Registrars are also reacting to webjackings by educating the
public in how to avoid being a webjacking victim. Network Solu-
tion's idNames division now offers a continuing legal education• 178
class ("CLE") in domain name basics for attorneys. By educating
counsel on the importance of security measures for the registra-
tions, Network Solutions hopes to diminish the potential for
webjacking problems.
Although the registrars have not issued any major changes to
prevent webjacking, that is not to say that the registrars view
webjacking as unimportant. As previously discussed, at the very
least, registrars view webjacking has an important customer service
and public relations issue because registrars suffer from bad press
for every webjacked domain name registration that gets published
in the news.
In the end, registrars maintain that they are not the proper en-
177. Id.
178. See announcement on-line, at http://www.nsol.com/news.
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tity to issue major changes to prevent webjacking. Many believe
that this authority rests instead with ICANN.
VI. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Unfortunately, there is no one answer on how to end webjack-
ings. It is a multi-faceted problem in which each of the parties-
the registrants and their counsel, the registrars, ICANN, and the
authorities-must work to take care of their portion of the solution.
There are, however, a few "big picture" changes that would help to
minimizing the effects of webjacking.
A. ICANN Should Improve Policies
ICANN should be encouraged to consider improvements to
certain policies, especially the policy concerning registration trans-
fers, and the policy for domain name dispute resolution.
The current procedure for domain name registration transfers
is basically:
-Registrant sends transfer request to new registrar.
-New registrar sends transfer request to the registry.
-Registry checks the transfer request information against the
whois database. If the transfer appears legitimate, the transfer
is authorized.
-Registry transfers the registration to the new registrar.
-Registry may send a notice of the transfer to the previous reg-
istrar.
This procedure fails to protect against webjacking because the
previous registrar is not given time to learn of and to report
webjackings to the registry. An improvement to the transfer proce-
dure would be to have the registry require a waiting period, per-
haps of one week, between any change to the registration and a
transfer to a new registrar. While such a waiting period may incon-
venience some registrants, it would remove some obstacles cur-
renfly faced in resolving webjacking situations.
ICANN should also react to the HOST.COM case, which was
recently issued under the UDRP and discussed above. The UDRP
should be sanctioned (and appropriately modified) for use in
webjacking cases in addition to its current purpose for trademark
infringement and cybersquatting problems.
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B. Law Enforcement Should Be Given Sufficient Resources To Combat
Computer Crimes
Given the complexity and technical nature of the means by
which webjackers act, authorities may be slow or reluctant in com-
puter related crimes to get involved. Authorities may also be con-
cerned over statutes that restrict their interception of electronic
communications.
79
C. Registrants Should Take Preventive Steps
It would take a large and influential group of Internet gurus to
get a more secure protocol developed and approved to replace
SMTP, so that e-mail messages would be more difficult to forge. It
would take a call center the size of a small town for a registrar to
replace their automated procedures with personnel manually
checking and approving each change or transfer request. 80 Fortu-
nately, many webjackings can be prevented without resorting to any
of these costly measures, although the onus is on the registrant to
follow the procedures. As one Ernst & Young expert said, "The so-
lution is look after yourself, because basically the sheriff can't."
8'
To combat webjacking, registrants should execute a four-fold
plan by: (1) using a good registrar, (2) maintaining security, (3)
managing registrations and paperwork, and (4) educating their
counsel and employees. First, registrants should find a registrar• • 182
that uses good authentication measures. Unfortunately, many
ly'83
registrars have a wholly inadequate authentication system. Al-
though digital signatures have been the promise of the e-commerce
for the past several years, digital signature technology has not be-
come user friendly enough to be adopted by the general public.
However, a simple password system, although a low-tech alternative
to PGP e-signatures, may provide adequate authentication and may
counter many webjacking attempts.
179. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000).
180. The registrar Melbourne IT is marketing itself as a more secure registrar,
stating that all domain name registration transfers will be first checked by a hu-
man. Jenny Sinclair, Alarm on Hijackings, THE AGE,June 13, 2000, available at 2000
WL 21652726. This noble policy may be impractical due to the large number of
transfers that occur in the world each day.
181. Susan Pigg, More Web Sites Caught in Net Scam, THE TORONTO STAR, June 2,
2000 (quoting Chris Anderson).
182. Rader, supra note 68.
183. Id.
2001] 1699
39
McGillivray and Lieske: Webjacking
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
In addition to its authentication policies, registrants should
look for a registrar with good customer service capabilities. If a
problem does develop with the registration, registrants should be
certain that they will be able to contact the registrar and receive
quick assistance.
Second, corporate registrants should draft and follow proper
security measures. In addition to the passwords remaining confi-
dential and not easy to be guessed, a policy must be put in place to
ensure that contact information is updated when the prior contact
person leaves the company. Some webjackers are really former
employees looking for revenge, and disabling a company's website
can be an easy target. To safeguard against an internal attack, reg-
istrants should ensure that the registrar is promptly notified to re-
move the contact person before that person leaves his or her em-
ployment.
Another precaution that registrants can take to protect their
rights is to manage their registrations and keep associated paper-
work. In the 1990's, businesses began creating the role of a CIO
(Chief Information Officer). Today, information management has
been promoted as a critical task. Securing web sites from webjack-
ing and other hazards is a full-time job. This is especially true
now that many large corporations have dozens, if not hundreds, of
domain name registrations. Now that registrars offer multi-lingual
registrations as well as country level registration in nearly 200 coun-
tries outside of the United States, corporations will continue to ac-
quire more domain name registrations. Corporations should set
up CIO or other formal positions charged with domain name man-
agement and security.
As part of the security program for a corporation, a new service
offered by SnapNames may be useful. SnapNames provides moni-
toring of domain name registrations "to reduce the impact of do-
main-related catastrophes.' As soon as a registration is altered
(such as the name server or the contact information), SnapNames'
SnapBack system will send e-mail alerts to three pre-designated
people. The alerts show what the domain name registration looked
like prior to the change and after the change. Such quick notifica-
tions may allow the registrant to recover from a webjacking before
184. Lock Up Your Data, 5 MATERiAL HANDLING MANAGEMENT 30 (May 2000).
185. Press Release, SnapNames, SnapNames and Major Registrars Partner in New
Domain Protection Technology (Nov. 15, 2000) (quoting Len Bayles), available at
www.snapnames.com/press-partnersPR.html.
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the registration changes propagate through the Internet.
Part of the domain name management includes maintaining a
paper copy of the registration activities. The e-mail notifications
that are received when domain names are set up, copies of the re-
quests for registrant data changes, and the like, make a paper trail
that can be offered as proof of registration ownership, if necessary.
Registrars are surprised when multi-million dollar companies are
unable to produce a paper copy of an e-mail that shows their le-
gitimate interests in a domain name registration, especially since
domain names are so valuable to many corporations.
Fourth, in-house, firm counsel, and employees who will be the
administrative, billing, or technical contacts for registrants must be
fully trained regarding the security issues in domain name registra-
tion. The Internet is becoming such a fundamental aspect of so
many areas of everyday business, that soon all attorneys will need to
lave more than a cursory understanding of webjacking and other
Internet law issues. And because it is easier to prevent a webjacking
than to recover from one, employees who are the contacts must be
fully aware of the importance of their roles.
VII. CONCLUSION
Network Solutions processes over 30,000 registration changes a
day.186 Tucows processes over 2,000 transfers daily. If the remain-
ing registrars process just a total of 8,000 changes each day, the
current system of registrars must make over ten million changes a
year. Because only a handful of webjackings are reported yearly,
registrants toss aside concern of being webjacked. Many think that
they are just as likely to be hit by lightening or to win the lottery as
they are to have their domain name webjacked.
As with lightening, however, webjacking does not seem to be a
big deal-until it happens to you. Then webjacking becomes very
serious and very expensive. The owner of the bali.com domain
name registration estimated it lost $100,000 a week when its site was
webjacked.
1
8
7
Registrants are not the only victims who are damaged by
webjacking. As webjacking continues, consumers will be hesitant to
place their trust in electronic commerce. While such concern re-
mains, growth of the Internet economy cannot be fully reached.
186. NSI's Webjacking Epidemic, Wired News 3:00 a.m. (June 8, 2000).
187. Hijacking Going High-Tech, THE LONDON FREE PRESS, (June 9, 2000), at D3.
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Therefore, webjacking and similar Internet fraud problems must be
addressed. As former President Bill Clinton stated, "We must give
consumers the same protection in our virtual mall they now get at
the shopping mall.",
8
188. The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving The Use of
The Internet, A Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Inter-
net, Appendix B (Mar. 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm.
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